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NOTES
CONFLICT RESOLVED: AN IMPLIED REMEDY
UNDER SECTION 10(b) OF THE '34 ACT SURVIVES
DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF EXPRESS REMEDIES
Section 10(b)1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) and
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-52 are conspicuous amidst
the complex body of federal securities regulations as the subjects of con-
siderable commentary.' Congress enacted section 10(b) to protect investors
by deterring deceptive and unfair practices in the securities markets.
1 15 U.S.C. 5 78j (1976) ('34 Act, S 10(b)). Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 ('34 Act), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
, 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5 (1982). The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) rule 10b-5
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange, (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) to engage
in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
Id.
, See A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as JACOBS] (com-
prehensive study of rule 10b-5). See generally Bahlman, Rule 10b-5: The Case For Its Full
Acceptance As Federal Corporation Law, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 727 (1968); Jacobs, The Role of
the Securities Exchange Act Rule lob-5 in the Regulation of Corporate Management, 59 COR-
NELL L. REV. 27 (1973); Project, Recent Developments in Securities Law: Causes ofAction Under
Rule lob-5, 26 Buffalo L. Rev. 503 (1977); Note, The Prospects for Rule X-1OB-5: An Emerging
Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120 (1950). [hereinafter cited as Emerging
Remedy].
'See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 10 (1934), reprinted in 5 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHOR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, items 17, 18 (1934)
(manipulative practices banned to insure investors of fair and honest markets); see also Hear-
ings on Stock Exchange Regulation Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (remarks of T. Corcoran) (S 10(b) allows SEC to regulate
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Section 10(b) prohibits the use of manipulative or deceptive devices in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security.5 Although section 10(b)
does not provide explicitly for a private right of action, courts consist-
ently have implied a remedy for defrauded private investors under the
statute.' Certain limitations, however, surround implied private actions
under section 10(b).7 For example, the purchaser-seller requirement
practices to prevent manipulative schemes and devices). See generally JACOBS, supra note
3, § 5.01 (concise examination of sparse legislative history surrounding S 10(b)).
15 U.S.C. S 78j(b) (1976). The language of 10(b) is subject to thorough examination
in widespread litigation, allowing courts to delineate precise categories and limitations that
apply under 5 10(b). See Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1026 (3d Cir.) (interpretation
of "in connection with" clause of S 10(b)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977); Sargent v. Genesco,
Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 763 (5th Cir. 1974) (interpretation of "purchase or sale" clause of S 10(b));
Sanders v. John Nuveeh & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1077 (7th Cir.) (interpretation of "security"),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972).
See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 241 (2d Cir.
1974) (implied right of action exists for violation of S 10(b)); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492
F.2d 750, 760 (5th Cir. 1974) (implementation of S 10(b) is dependent on implied private ac-
tion); James v. Gei'ber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944, 950 (6th Cir. 1973) (implied right of action
under S 10(b) to reduce incidence of fraud). The Supreme Court initiated the implication
of private rights of action based on the general tort principle that liability should attach
to wrongful conduct despite the absence of a statute specifically providing injured persons
a cause of action. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916). The Rigsby
Court implied a private right of action under the Federal Safety Appliance Act even though
the statute did not provide an explicit remedy. Id. In 1946, a district court first recognized
an implied right of action under S 10(b). Kardon v. National Gypsum, Co., 69 F. Supp. 512,
513 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Kardon Court justified an implied right of action on the common-
law principle that wrongful conduct in violation of a statute necessitated a remedy for the
wronged party. Id. The Supreme Court eventually recognized the existence of an implied
right of action under S 10(b) without employing any specific analysis. See Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). In the realm of federal securities
laws, the Supreme Court has evidenced a trend towards expansive statutory interpreta-
tion permitting implied rights of action. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 429-30
(1964). In Borak, the Court inferred a cause of action for damages in favor of shareholders
relying on misleading proxy statements distributed in violation of S 14(a) of the '34 Act.
Id. Although § 14(a) created no specific remedy, the Borak Court determined that private
actions were necessary supplements to SEC suits to achieve the congressional goal of prevent-
ing proxy fraud. Id. at 432-33. The Court also stated that federal courts should provide
remedies for violations of federal statutes. Id. Moreover, the Court in Borak encouraged
lower courts to imply private remedies under other sections of the securities laws. Id. at
433. The liberal approach delineated in Borak waned in later Supreme Court decisions that
evinced a trend toward limiting implied rights of action. See, e.g., Securities Investor Pro-
tection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 420-21 (1975) (no private right of action implied under
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970Y, National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n.
of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (no implied right of action permitted under
Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970). But see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran,
456 U.S. 353, 381 (1982) (right of action implied under Commodity Exchange Act). See generally
Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REv. 285,291
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Note]; Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrak and
Ash: Some Implications for Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1392, 1393 (1975).
See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231-32 (1980) (must have fiduciary
relationship to create duty to disclose under S 10(b)); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S.
[Vol. 40:1039
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specifies that only actual purchasers and sellers of securities have stand-
ing to sue under section 10(b).1 Another limitation is the scienter require-
ment, which stipulates that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defen-
dant acted with the intent to defraud.' Since section 10(b) serves as a broad
antifraud provision, however, the scope of the statute often overlaps the
express remedies of the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) and the '34 Act.0
When both the express and implied antifraud remedies are available to
plaintiffs injured by the same actionable conduct, the question arises which
remedy the plaintiffs may elect. 1' The Supreme Court recently resolved
the conflict between section 10(b) and express liability provisions in Hud-
dleston v. Herman & MacLean,2 and concluded that an implied right of
action under section 10(b) exists despite the presence of an express remedy
governing the defendant's conduct."
Both the '33 and '34 Acts provide several express remedies allowing
private actions for damages. 4 Congress designed the '33 Act to regulate
462, 477 (1977) (deception or manipulation required for action under 5 10(b)); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (scienter required in cause of action under S 10(b));
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975) (only purchasers and sellers
maintain standing to sue under § 10(b)).
I See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975) (only plain-
tiffs who actually purchase or sell securities can obtain standing under S 10(b)). But see
A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD § 8.8 (1982) (sug-
gesting considerable evidence exists that S 10b's purchaser-seller requirement is subject
to attrition). See generally Note, Standing Under Rule lob-5 After Blue Chip Stamps, 75 MICH.
L. REV. 413, 431-37 (1976) (discussion of exceptions to purchaser-seller rule after Blue Chip).
I See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976); infra note 27 (scienter
requirement).
10 See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 777-78 (1979) (applying S 17(a) of '33 Act
to conduct also prohibited by S 10(b) of '34 Act). In Naftalin, the Supreme Court admitted
that the '34 Act and the '33 Act prohibit some of the same conduct. Id. In finding that
defendant guilty of securities fraud under S 17(a) of the '33 Act, the Court recognized that
the overlap between the securities laws does not limit the broad sanctions of S 17(a)'s anti-
fraud provisions). Id. In SECv. National Sec., Inc., the Supreme Court described the overlap
of remedies as neither unusual nor unfortunate. 393 U.S. 453, 468 (1969). In the savings
clauses included in the '33 and '34 Acts, Congress rejected the notion that express remedies
of the securities laws would preempt all other rights of action. See Huddleston v. Herman
& MacLean, 51 U.S.L.W. 4099, 4101 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1983). Section 16 of the '33 Act states
that the right and remedies provided in the '33 Act are additional to all other rights and
remedies existing in equity or law. See 15 U.S.C. S 77p (1976). The '34 Act contains a similar
provision in § 28(a), stating that the remedies under the '34 Act recognized any and all
additional remedies. See 15 U.S.C. S 78bb(a) (1976).
11 See Ross v. A.H. Robbins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 554 (2d Cir. 1979) (existence of express
remedy under S 18 of '34 Act does not preclude implication of 5 10(b) private right of ac-
tion). See generally Note, Rule 10b-5: The Circuits Debate the Exclusivity of Remedies, the
Purchaser-Seller Requirement, and Constructive Deception, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 877,877-88
(1980) (examining conflict between express remedy under S 18 and implied remedy under
5 10(b)) [hereinafter cited as The Circuits Debate].
12 51 U.S.L.W. 4099 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1983).
" Id. at 4102-03.
1 See infra text accompanying notes 37-48 (examination of express remedies available
10411983]
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corporations offering new issues of securities on the market. 5 By control-
ling new offerings of securities, Congress sought to curb fraud in the sale
of securities'6 and to provide public investors with full and fair disclosure
of information regarding the securities." Recognizing a need for additional
investor protection," however, Congress implemented the '34 Act, which
requires issuers to furnish full and accurate corporate reports about
securities on a continuous basis." Congress formulated the remedies of
both the '33 and '34 Acts primarily to deter illicit business practices in
the securities markets rather than to compensate injured parties.2' Yet,
Congress responded to pressures from the business section which feared
rigid regimentation by imposing numerous limitations on the express
remedies under both the '33 and '34 Acts.
2
Despite the existence of express remedies in the '33 and '34 Acts,
courts often have implied private rights of action under other sections
of the Acts." A widely litigated implied remedy is section 10(b), which
under '33 and '34 Acts); see also 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1692-1754 (1961) (providing
detailed discussion of express remedies under '33 and '34 Acts).
"1 See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933). Congress intended the '33 Act to
affect new offerings of securities and not the ordinary redistribution of securities. Id.
" See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). Congress described the aim of the '33
Act as the prevention of further public exploitation through the sale of unsound, fraudulent,
and worthless securities by securities dealers. Id.; see also Douglas & Bates, The Federal
Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171,172 (1933) ('33 Act sought to minimize risks in market
by imposing severe penalties for fraudulent transactions).
" See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). A fundamental
purpose of the '33 Act centered on replacing the caveat emptor philosophy with a philosophy
of full disclosure aimed at achieving a higher standard of business ethics in the securities
industry. Id. The keystone of the entire structure of federal securities legislation is disclosure.
Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
H.R. Doc. No. 95,88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963); seeFeit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp.,
332 F. Supp. 544, 563-68(E.D.N.Y. 1971) (detailed analysis of disclosure requirement as means
of investor protection); Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REV.
607, 610 (1964) (greater opportunity for fraud when less information available).
" See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934) (excessive speculation prompted re-
examination of securities laws to formulate measures aimed at continually providing in-
vestors with additional information after initial offering of stock). The '34 Act sought to
establish an enduring system of national regulation of securities exchanges providing infor-
mation to private investors on a continuous basis. See Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited,
79 HARV. L. REV. 1340,1355 (1966) ('34 Act established continuous disclosure system for issuers).
19 See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1934) ('34 Act designed to provide ade-
quate information reasonably up-to-date for as long as security is traded or exchanged);
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-13 (1934) (proper and adequate reporting is necessary
to prevent manipulation and dishonest practices in marketplace).
" See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934) ('34 Act prevents inequitable and un-
fair practices on exchanges); Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J.
227, 227 (1933) (provisions for civil liability under '33 Act characterized as preventive rather
than redressive).
21 See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934) (Congress designed securities laws
to benefit business by making necessary changes).
2 See, e.g., Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir.) (private right of ac-
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Congress designed as an open-ended provision aimed at deterring fraud.'
Under section 10(b), Congress expressly vested the SEC with the power
to enjoin manipulative and deceptive conduct in cases of fraud that Con-
gress did not envision during the formulation of the statute.2 4
Although section 10(b) does not enumerate specifically the re-
quirements for a cause of action, courts have delineated the distinct
elements constituting an implied private right of action under the
provision.2 For example, a plaintiff must show that the defendant engaged
in manipulative or deceptive conduct which injured the plaintiff in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security.28 In addition, the plain-
tiff must prove that the defendant acted with scienterY A plaintiff in a
section 10(b) material misrepresentation case must provide evidence of
reliance,' though courts generally presume reliance once a plaintiff
tion implied under § 17(a) of the '33 Act), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1978); GAF Corp. v.
Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 720 (2d Cir. 1971) (private right of action for stockholders inferred
under § 13(d)), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
, 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b) (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 4-6 (description of 5 10(b)
provisions) and infrja text accompanying notes 25-36 (same).
U 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) expressly designates the SEC as the enforce-
ment agency responsible for curtailing manipulative and deceptive devices in the market
place. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1934). Congress provided no guidance,
however, in the area of private civil remedies under § 10(b). See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 183, 196 (1976).
1 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975). The elements
comprising an implied right of action under § 10(b) evolved through judicial interpretation
and construction. Id.; see also Note, Implied Liability Under the Securities Exchange Act,
61 HARV. L. Rxv. 858, 861-64 (1948) (examination of judicially-created elements of implied
remedy under § 10(b)). See generally Comment, Rule lob-5: Elements of a Private Right of
Action, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 541 (1968) (thorough discussion of elements of implied cause of ac-
tion under S 10(b)).
15 U.S.C. S 78j(b) (1976); see Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 n.14 (1977)
(§10(b) prohibits material misstatement or omission); see also Loss, supra note 14, at 1682-1805
(elaborate discussion of implied remedy under § 10(b) involving elements of cause of action).
See generally Emerging Remedy, supra note 3.
" Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-214 (1976). The Supreme Court in
Hochfelder concluded that plaintiffs must prove scienter as opposed to negligence. Id. at
199. The Supreme Court characterized scienter as a mental state embracing an intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud. Id. The Hochfelder Court did not resolve the question whether
reckless conduct is sufficient to establish liability under § 10(b). Id. at 193 n.12. Nevertheless,
courts have permitted a showing of recklessness to satisfy the scienter requirement. See
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977) (reckless behavior suffi-
cient to constitute scienter); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045
(7th Cir. 1976) (recklessness is functional equivalent of intent to defraud), cert. denied 434
U.S. 875 (1977); see also Franks v. Midwestern Oklahoma Dev. Auth. [1976 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,786 at 90,850 (W.D. Okla. 1976). The Franks Court defined
recklessness as a highly unreasonable omission, invoking not merely simple negligence,
but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, presenting an obvious danger
of misleading buyers or sellers. Id.
23 See, e.g., Titan Group, inc. v. Faggan, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir.) (reliance is
demonstrable in cases of affirmative misrepresentation), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975);
1983] 1043
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demonstrates a material omission.29 To obtain standing to sue, a plaintiff
must qualify as a purchaser or seller of a security.' From the standpoint
of the plaintiff, a section 10(b) suit is attractive since courts provide a
variety of remedies including damages, equitable relief, and restitution. 1
The traditional measure of damages in section 10(b) suits is the out-of-
pocket scheme, which awards plaintiffs the fair value paid for the secur-
ity at the time of the transaction." Moreover, the plaintiff in a section
10(b) action benefits from a relatively long statute of limitations' and is
not required to post a security bond for costs.' In contrast to many ex-
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.) (test of reliance is whether misrepresen-
tation is substantial factor in determining course of conduct which results in loss), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 908 (1965).
' See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). In Affiliated
Ute, the Supreme Court examined an instance of total nondisclosure, determining that since
evidence of reliance was not feasible, materiality served as the decisive element. Id. The
test for materiality was whether a reasonable man would attach importance to the alleged
omission in guiding his investment conduct. Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggan, 513 F.2d 234, 239
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975). In nondisclosure cases, materiality rather than
reliance is a determinative factor in causation. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Ross, 509
F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1975). The Second Circuit has determined that a determination of
materiality permits a logical inference of reliance. See Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Note, The Reliance Re-
quirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lob-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584, 590-91 (1975).
1 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729-31 (1975) (Supreme Court
limited application of § 10(b) only to actual purchasers or sellers of securities).
31 See JACOBS, supra note 3, § 260.01, at 11-9 (discussing panoply of remedies available
under 5 10(b)).
Id. S 260.03(cXii) (out-of-pocket measure of damages). The out-of-pocket measure of
damages under S 10(b) allows the defrauded seller to recover the fair value of the security
the seller sold minus the fair value of the consideration received, all measured at the time
of the transaction. Jacobs, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases, 65 GEo. L.J. 1093,
1099 (1977). A defrauded buyer may recover the fair value of the consideration the buyer
paid for the security minus the fair value of the security received, again all measured at
the time of the transaction. Id. A plaintiff under § 10(b) typically uses the out-of-pocket
measure of damages. See, e.g., Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 239 (7th Cir. 1974)
(out-of-pocket measure is traditionally only measure in fraud actions); Arber v. Essex Wire
Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 422 (6th Cir.) (out-of-pocket expenses traditional measure), cert. denied
419 U.S. 830 (1974); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 745 (8th Cir. 1967) (same), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 951 (1968).
1 See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946). Since S 10(b) does not provide
expressly for a statute of limitations, courts have interpreted the silence of Congress to
indicate that federal policy sanctions the adoption of the statute of limitations of the par-
ticular forum state. Id. The applicable state statute of limitations remains an open ques-
tion, though most states apply the statute of limitations governing common-law fraud in
§ 10(b) suits rather than the limitation applicable under the blue sky laws. See Loss. supra
note 14, at 1771-75. Courts generally apply the longer statute of limitations to give defrauded
investors every opportunity to file suit because the purpose of the securities law embraces
fairness and protection for private investors. See Note, Federal Statutes Without Limita-
tions Provisions, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 68, 74-78 (1953).
See Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 788-89 (2d Cir. 1951) (valid claim
under S 10(b) confers no authority on judge to require bond for expenses).
[Vol. 40:1039
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press. remedies, plaintiffs under section 10(b) possess a broad venue
option." As a further advantage, prejudgment interest is available to plain-
tiffs who prevail in section 10(b) suits3
Notwithstanding the broader implied remedy under section 10(b), the
express remedies of the '33 and '34 Acts focus on specific types of con-
duct that Congress sought to eliminate in the securities markets." For
example, section 11 of the '33 Act creates an express private remedy for
material misstatements or omissions in registration statements3 In con-
trast to section 10(b), however, section 11 contains a restrictive statute
of limitations and requires plaintiffs to post a security bond to cover costs.'
I See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976). Section 27 of the '34 Act is the venue provision govern-
ing § 10(b) suits. Section 27 grants venue wherever the defendant is located, resides, or
transacts business, or where the offer or sale took place. Id. Compare Id. (broad venue
provisions available under § 10(b)) with Id. S 77v(a) (stricter venue provision applicable to
5 11 and 12(2) of '33 Act).
" See Cant v. A. G. Becker & Co., 384 F. Supp. 814, 815 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (prejudgment
interest awarded if plaintiff deprived of beneficial use of funds). But see Thomas v. Duralite
Co., 524 F.2d 577, 589 (3d Cir. 1975) (courts must exercise discretion in awarding prejudg-
ment interest since interest recovered as matter of fairness and not merely as compensa-
tion for money withheld). See generally Jacobs, The Measure of Damages in Rule lob-5 Cases,
65 GEo. L.J. 1093, 1160-63 (1977).
See infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text (discussion of express remedies).
15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976). The scope of § 11 extends to the underwriters of the offering,
any member of the board of directors of the company at the time of the offering, officers
of the company who signed the registration statement, and any expert involved in the prepara-
tion of the registration statement. Id. The attorney participating in the preparation of a
registration statement is not an expert for 5 11 purposes. See BLO0MENTHAL, 1982 SECURITIES
LAW HANDBOOK, § 11.03, at 175 [hereinafter cited as BLOOMENTHAL]. Rather, an attorney acts
as an agent in compiling and presenting information, and therefore is not ordinarily liable
under § 11 in his capacity as an attorney. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp.
643, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See generally Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933,
43 YALE L.J. 171, 171-210 (1933) (general discussion of express remedies under '33 Act, in-
cluding § 11). To comport with the congressional purpose of full disclosure, § 11 allows
purchasers of securities to assert claims against the issuer and other defendants involved
in the preparation of false registration statements. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976); see Barnes v.
Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1967) (class of plaintiffs under S 11 limited to defrauded
purchasers). As an additional aspect of § 11, plaintiffs do not have to show that the defen-
dant acted with scienter since liability is virtually absolute given evidence of a material
misstatement or omission. See Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir.
1951) (§ 11 protects private investors regardless of fraud); Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp.
341, 346 (S.D. N.Y. 1974) (scienter is not element of S 11 action); Stewart v. Bennett, 359
F. Supp. 878, 884 n.16 (D. Mass. 1973) (same).
" 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976) (statute of limitations provision applicable to S 11); id. 77k(e)
(provision allowing court to impose security bond in S 11 suit). The statute of limitations
contained in § 13 of the '33 Act provides that plaintiffs proceeding under 5 11 must bring
suit within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or omission and within
three years after the issuer offered the security to the public. Id. The earliest date from
which the three-year limitation could run is the effective date of the registration state-
ment. See Morse v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 445 F. Supp. 619, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Section 11(e) permits a court to attach a security bond for costs, including attorney's fees.
15 U.S.C. S 77k(e) (1976). In addition, a court may award security for expenses under § 11(e)
19831 1045
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Moreover, as an affirmative defense, defendants can obtain exoneration
by showing the exercise of due diligence in inspecting the registration
statement" before publication. Other express remedies of the securities
acts possess similar limitations and defenses carefully delineated by
Congress. 4' Both sections 12(1) and 12(2) of the '33 Act limit the remedy
of the purchaser to only the immediate seller.4 2 Furthermore, section 12
contains a restrictive statute of limitations and requires the plaintiff to
post a security bond for costs.4 3 Also, the defendant can avoid liability
to the successful party if the court determines a suit or a defense is without merit. See.
e.g., Rucker v. Laco, Inc., 496 F.2d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 1974) (defendant awarded security
in suit determined as frivolous); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1309 n.33
(2d Cir. 1973) (costs assessed against defendant offering defense bordering on frivolity);
Miller v. Schweickart, 413 F. Supp. 1059, 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (costs awarded in case of
frivolity or bad faith).
15 U.S.C. S 77k(b)(3)(A) (1976). Congress established different standards of due diligence
for expert versus nonexpert defendants, which if met would exonerate defendants from
liability under § 11. See JACOBS. supra note 3, S 3.01(o). To establish a due diligence defense
in a S 11 suit, the defendant must demonstrate under any unexpertized portion of the registra-
tion statement that the defendant believed, after reasonable investigation, that the registra-
tion statement was accurate. 15 U.S.C. 5 77k(b)(3)(A) (1976). The standard of care used to
determine whether the defendant has satisfied the due diligence defense is that required
of a prudent man in the management of his own property. Id. S 77k(c).
4" See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. S 771(1) (1976) (S 12(1) provides absolute liability for defendants
who fail to comply with registration requirement); id. S 771(2) (S 12(2) provides that any
person who sells securities by means of prospectus or oral communication concerning material
misstatement or omission is liable to purchaser of securities). The plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case creating absolute liability under S 12(1) by merely proving that he pur-
chased the security, and that the required registration statement was not in effect. Id.
S 771(1); see Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617, 621 (5th Cir. 1973) (absolute liability
attaches when requisite elements of cause of action proved). In contrast to S 10(b), the plaintiff
in a S 12(1) suit does not have to prove the defendant acted with scienter since a violation
of S 12(1) establishes absolute liability, making the defendant's intent and knowledge irrele-
vant. See Loss, supra note 14, at 1718 (seller's intent and knowledge irrelevant in S 12(1) ac-
tion). Unlike S 11, § 12(2) applies to all transactions and securities and not merely those
including registration statements. 15 U.S.C. S 771(2) (1976). Section 12(2) is applied despite
exemptions and whether or not defendant filed a registration statement. See Kroungold
v. Triester, 407 F. Supp. 414, 418 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (S 12(2) has as much applicability to
unregistered securities as to securities for which defendant has filed registration state-
ment); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089, 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (exempted
securities still subject to requirements and liabilities of § 12(2)).
42 15 U.S.C. S 771(2) (1976). The strict privity requirement of S 12 arises from the in-
troductory language to both SS 12(1) and 12(2) which refers to any person who offers or
sells, and from the language which provides that sellers found in violation are liable to
persons purchasing from them. Id. S 771(1), (2); see, e.g., Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279,
287 (S.D. N.Y. 1975) (S 12 actions generally limited to immediate seller); B & B Inv. Club
v. Kleinert's, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 720, 725 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (buyer-seller relationship necessary
in S 12 actions); Hardy v. Sanson, 356 F. Supp. 1034, 1038 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (S 12 allows action
only against immediate seller).
" See 15 U.S.C. S 77m (1976) (statute of limitations); id. 5 77k(e) (security bond). The
applicable statute of limitations for SS 11, 12 and 15 exists under S 13 of the '33 Act. Id.
Under S 12(1), a plaintiff must institute an action within one year after the violation and
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by proving that the defendant did not know and, in the exercise of
reasonable care, could not have known of the material misstatement or
omission."
Congress also furnished several express, yet limited remedies in the
'34 Act under sections 9(e), 16(b), and 18(a).4 5 Both sections 9(e) and 18 pro-
vide relatively short statutes of limitations and permit a court to require
the posting of a security bond.' Although section 16(b) does not require
a plaintiff to post a security bond for costs, section 16(b) does provide
a restrictive statute of limitations, forcing plaintiffs to commence suit no
more than two years after a violation. 7 In addition, section 18(a) allows
the defendant to claim as an affirmative defense that the defendant acted
in good faith and possessed no knowledge of a violation of section 18(a).1
Aside from specific civil liability provisions, the '34 Act also contains
within three years after the initial offering to the public. Id. Under S 12(2), a plaintiff must
bring suit within one year after discovering the misrepresentation and within three years
of the sale. Id. A general provision in 5 11(e) gives courts discretion to require a security
bond for costs for plaintiffs suing under 55 11, 12 and 15. 15 U.S.C. S 77k(e); see supra note
26 (discussion of security requirement under S 11(e)).
" 15 U.S.C. 5 771 (1976).
"5 See id. S 78i(e) (5 9(e) allows any person who purchases or sells a listed security
to recover damages from any person who willfully manipulates price of the security); id.
5 78p(b) (5 16 affords issuers remedy against insiders who use information unfairly to ob-
tain short-term profits); id. 5 78r(a) (5 18 permits action by anyone who purchased or sold
securities in reliance on false or misleading statement of material fact included in docu-
ment or report fied with national securities exchange).
Id. 5 78i(e) (S 9(e)); id. S 78r(a) (5 18(a)). Section 9(e) authorizes a court to require
an undertaking for the payment of the expenses incurred in the suit and to assess reasonable
costs, including attorney's fees, against either party. Id. 5 78i(e). Additionally, a plaintiff
must file a 5 9(e) action within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the
violation and within three years after such violation. Id. Under 5 18(a), the plaintiff must
bring an action within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the cause of
action and within three years after the cause of action accrued. Id. 5 78r(c); see Jacobson
v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 445 F. Supp. 518, 527 (S.D. N.Y. 1977). Section 18(a) also
permits a court to require a plaintiff or defendant to post a security bond for expenses
in the event of bad faith. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(c); see S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1934).
Congress provided for protection against strike suits by authorizing a court to assess costs,
including attorney's fees, against either party. 15 U.S.C. 5 78r(c); see S. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1934).
'7 15 U.S.C. 5 78p(b) (1976).
'5 Id. 5 78r(a). Under 5 18(a), good faith is an absolute defense to allegations by the
plaintiff that he relied on a false or misleading statement of material fact in a filed report
in purchasing or selling a security. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976).
As an additional onus under S 18(a), the plaintiff must demonstrate that the false or misleading
statement affected the purchase or sale price of the security. 15 U.S.C. S 78r(a) (1976). Con-
gress inserted the clause requiring the plaintiff to show that the misstatement affected
the price of the security to compel the showing of a causal connection between the untruth
and the fall in value that allegedly caused the plaintiff's loss. Id.; see also 78 CONG. REC.
7708 (1934) (discussion of 5 18(a) express remedy). See generally Comment, Civil Liability
for Misstatements in Documents Filed Under Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act, 44
YALE L.J. 456, 460-62 (1935).
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a general provision enabling an innocent party to void a contract.49 Sec-
tion 29(b) voids every contract made or performed in violation of the '34
Act and negates the rights of any person making or performing that
contract.' Judicial interpretation of section 29(b) has established that the
violative contract is voidable at the option of the innocent party rather
than void as a matter of law. 1 Further judicial interpretation has shown
that a plaintiff can avoid a contract under section 29(b) by demonstrating
that the contract involved a prohibited transactions and that the plaintiff
maintained contractual privity with the defendant.' In addition, the plain-
tiff must show membership in the class of persons that Congress envi-
sioned protecting under the '34 Act.' Although the specific language of
section 29(b) does not provide any affirmative defenses, courts have per-
mitted defendants to raise the equitable defenses of waiver and estoppel
in attempting to avoid rescission of the contract.5
In comparison to section 10(b), the express liability provisions stand
" 15 U.S.C. S 78cc(b) (1976).
" Id.; see Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1970). The Mills Court
suggested that an aggrieved party invoking a remedy under S 29(b) may preclude the guilty
party from enforcing a contract. See also Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Section 29(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: A Viable Remedy Awakened, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 13 n.65 (1979)
(holding in Mills regarding S 29(b)).
51 See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1970) (contract voidable
at option of innocent party); Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 792 (8th Cir.
1967) (same); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1962) (same);
Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Belanca Corp., 288 F.2d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 1961) (same). Section
29(b) vests all of the options in the innocent party and leaves none for the guilty party.
See Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note 50, at 8. Contra Myzel v. Fields, 386 F. 2d 718
(8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). The Myzel Court reasoned that § 29(b) man-
dated that contracts are void as a matter of law. Id. The holding in Myzel, however, is
inconsistent with the language of S 29(b), which suggests that the contract is not ipso facto
void, but that the rights of the guilty party are void. See Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra
note 50, at 6 n.22.
" See Eastside Church of Christ v. National Plan, Inc., 391 F.2d 357, 362 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 913 (1968). Section 29(b) contemplates a civil suit for relief by way
of rescission and damages when transaction are void. 15 U.S.C. S 78cc(b) (1976); see Osborne
v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869, 879 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
See Regional Properties v. Financial & Real Estate Consulting Co., 678 F.2d 552,
559 (5th Cir. 1982) (contractual privity is element of cause of action under S 29(b)); Gruen-
baum & Steinberg, supra, note 50, at 31-36 (discussion of contractual privity requirement).
See Regional Properties, Inc. v. Financial & Real Estate Consulting Co., 678 F.2d
552, 559 (5th Cir. 1982) (must show membership in class statute designed to protect to in-
voke S 29 relief).
I Id. at 562-63; see Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212-14 (9th Cir.
1962). In Royal Air Properties, Inc., the defendant sought to introduce evidence in the trial
court to establish the affirmative defenses of estoppel, waiver, and laches. Id. at 212. The
district court decided that the proffered defenses were not available in a S 29(b) action.
Id. at 213. The Ninth Circuit, however, held that since courts generally interpret statutes
in the context of the common law and Congress has not denied specifically the availability
of equitable defenses, no reason exists to preclude the ordinary defenses of estoppel and
waiver. Id. at 214.
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as less attractive remedies because of the carefully delineated procedural
restrictions surrounding the express remedies. Sections 11 and 12 of the
'33 Act impose stringent restrictions in the relatively short statutes of
limitations and the cost assessment provisions. 8 Additionally, section 11
limits the class of plaintiffs exclusively to purchasers of securities and
section 12 allows a right of action only against immediate sellers. 7 Plain-
tiffs also may decline to proceed under the narrowly defined express
remedies in view of the various statutory affirmative defenses such as
due diligence and reasonable care prescribed in sections 11 and 12
respectively."
The limitations and procedural restrictions surrounding the express
liability provisions of the '34 Act also render section 10(b) a more appeal-
ing remedy. Under section 9(e) of the '34 Act, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant's manipulative conduct materially affected
the price of the security.59 Moreover, section 9(e) stipulates that willfulness
on the part of the defendant is an element of a cause of action." Section
18(a) of the '34 Act requires the plaintiff to show reliance on a false or
misleading statement of material fact included in a document or report
filed with a national securities exchange.' In contrast to section 10(b),
See supra notes 38-44 (description of express remedies under 5§ 11 and 12).
, See Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279, 285-86 (S.D. N.Y. 1975) (recovery under S
11 limited to purchasers of shares issued pursuant to allegedly defective registration state-
ment); Stewart v. Bennett, 359 F. Supp. 878, 884 n.14 (D. Mass. 1973) (only persons purchas-
ing securities that are direct subject of registration statement and prospectus may sue
under 5 11); supra note 41 (describing class of plaintiffs under S 12).
-1 See supra notes 40 & 44 and accompanying text (describing defenses of due diligence
and reasonable care).
11 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976) ( 9(e) plaintiff to show defendant's conduct materially af-
fected price of security); cf. id. 5 78j(b) (§ 10(b) does not require plaintiff to show causal
connection between defendant's conduct and price of security).
15 U.S.C. 5 78i(e) (1976). In practical terms, the willfulness requirement under § 9(e)
is the virtual equivalent of scienter as required under a S 10(b) cause of action. See Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 201. Under S 9(e), the requirement that plaintiff
demonstrate willful manipulation appears similar to the requirement of proof under 5 10(b),
providing for some element of scienter. Id.
6 15 U.S.C. S 78r(a) (1976). Section 18 of the '34 Act permits an action by a purchaser
or seller of a security who relied on a false or misleading statement of material fact in-
cluded in a document or report filed with a national securities exchange. Id. Unlike 5 11
of the '33 Act, a plaintiff suing under S 18(a) must prove not only a misrepresentation of
material fact, but that the plaintiff either read the filed document or relied on a repetition
of the statement. Id.; see BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 38, S 11.06, at 184 (asserting that plaintiff
must read any filed document or rely on copy of that document to prove cause of action
under § 18(a)). Courts have determined that plaintiffs must show some reliance on the filed
documents to succeed under S 18(a). See Jacobson v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 445
F. Supp. 518, 525 (S.D. N.Y. 1977) (since reliance on actual document needed, constructive
reliance is not enough); Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 438 F. Supp. 190, 195 (S.D.
N.Y. 1977) (reliance in some form is necessary). But cf. Rudnick v. Franchard Corp., 237
F. Supp. 871, 873 (S.D. N.Y. 1965) (under § 11(a) of '33 Act plaintiffs suing as open market
purchasers can establish reliance without actually reading registration statement).
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which requires recklessness to incur liability, courts construing sections
9(e) and 18 have refused to attach liability for mere reckless conduct.2
Finally, the absence of the procedural elements of posting a security bond
for costs and restrictive statutes of limitations, both of which adhere under
sections 9(e), 16, and 18, make section 10(b) a considerably more desirable
remedy for aggrieved shareholders."
Plaintiffs urged courts to imply a right of action under section 10(b)
because the open-ended nature and relative lack of restrictions contrast
favorably with the many procedural and substantive restrictions surround-
ing the express remedies of the Acts." In response to plaintiffs' arguments,
courts recognized that an implied right of action would effectuate the pur-
poses of the federal securities laws."5 Even the Supreme Court had sug-
gested that the lower courts imply rights of action to grant the necessary
relief for invasions of federally secured rights." Although implied remedies
often overlapped express liability provisions, courts reasoned that the
securities laws were cumulative, and therefore implication of remedies
promoted the congressional policy of providing complete and effective
sanctions."
In the last ten years, however, the Supreme Court has evinced a trend
away from implying rights of action in all areas of the law by favoring
strict statutory interpretation. 8 Accordingly, the ultimate issue for the
62 See Higgins, Section 18 of the Exchange Act: A New Defense Weapon in Securities
Litigation, 1980 DET. C. L. REv. 761, 787 (1980) (§§ 9(e) and 18 of '34 Act appear to preclude
liability for recklessness).
See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (express remedies under '34 Act).
See Stewart v. Bennett, 359 F. Supp. 878, 881 n.10 (D. Mass. 1973) (implied right
of action recognized under broad and unbridled provisions of § 1O(b)); supra (text accompa-
nying notes 38-48 examination of express remedies under '33 and '34 Acts).
" See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (implied right of action
exists under proxy rules containing language similar to that under S 10(b)); Herpich v. Wallace,
430 F.2d 792, 804 (5th Cir. 1970) (implied S 10(b) remedy necessary to effectuate congres-
sional purpose behind S 10(b)); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d
Cir. 1967) (broad remedial purposes of '34 Act suggest that judicial relief is available under
S 10(b) implied remedy).
' J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964). The Borak decision reaffirmed the
remedial powers of the courts established in Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33,
39-40 (1916), which held that courts can create remedies to insure the enforcement of statutory
rights. See 377 U.S. at 433.
6 See Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 273-74 (9th Cir. 1961). The Ellis Court permitted
a defrauded purchaser to sue under S 10(b) despite the restrictions imposed by the express
remedies of the '33 Act. Id. at 273. The Ellis court, however, recognized that such a harsh
construction poses the danger of nullifying or ignoring the procedural restrictions that Con-
gress carefully provided in the '33 Act. Id. Compare Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188
F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951) (purchasers afforded remedy under S 10(b) notwithstanding that
basis of fraud also constituted § 11 violation) with Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80
F. Supp. 123, 124-25 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (S 10(b) inapplicable when S 11 or § 12 action available).
Courts implied a remedy under § 10(b) by depending on a broad interpretation of the remedial
provisions of the securities laws. See infra text accompanying notes 106-32 (discussion of
Huddleston decision).
" See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 94 (1981) (no
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Court in deciding whether to imply private rights of action is whether
Congress actually intended to create a private remedy under a statute. 9
Though the Court presaged a tendency to retrench implied remedies in
1974,70 the first systematic effort appeared in 1975. In Cort v. Ash,7' the
Court announced a four-pronged test to determine whether the judiciary
may infer a private cause of action from a regulatory statute." First, a
court must establish whether the plaintiff possesses membership in the
class of people for whose special benefit Congress enacted the statute.3
Second, a court should identify whether any indication of legislative in-
inferred cause of action under Equal Pay Act of 1963 preventing discrimination by employers);
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297-98 (1981) (no inferred cause of action under Rivers
and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 prohibiting obstructions on navigable waters); Univer-
sities Research Ass'n. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 771-72 (1981) (no inferred cause of action under
Davis-Bacon Act governing minimum wages under construction contracts).
"2 See Universities Research Ass'n. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770 (1981) (Court recog-
nized primacy of congressional intent in determining whether to imply right of action).
71 See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n. of R.R. Passengers (Amtrak),
414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974). In Amtrak, the Supreme Court refused to imply a private right
of action under S 404(a) of the Amtrak Act. Id. at 455-57; see 45 U.S.C. 5 564(a) (1976) (ap-
plicable provision of Amtrak Act). In concluding that no implied right of action existed,
the Amtrak Court relied on the ancient maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 414
U.S. at 458. Literally, expressio unius est exclusio alterius means that the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of the other. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1978). The specifica-
tion of certain things or persons in a statute creates the inference of an intention to ex-
clude all others from its operation. Id. Under the expressio maxim, a court should not infer
remedies under a statute when other provisions expressly designate a remedy. 414 U.S.
at 458. Without evidence of contrary congressional intent, the Amtrak Court determined
that the expressio maxim mandated that the express remedies were the exclusive liability
provisions supplied by the Amtrak Act. Id. at 457-58. The Court recognized that courts
may expand statutory provisions drafted by Congress only upon a showing of legislative
intent indicating the propriety of supplementary remedies to the statutory scheme. Id.
71 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
1' Id. at 78. In Cort, a shareholder suing corporate directors derivatively argued for
an implied right of action under a statute prohibiting corporations from making contribu-
tions in federal elections. Id. at 68-69. In denying the implication of a cause of action, the
Court applied four criteria and stated that both the legislative history and the overall
legislative purpose provided no basis from which to infer a remedy. Id. at 68-70. The Court
suggested that permitting a new cause of action was a congressional, not a judicial, respon-
sibility. Id. at 69.
" Id.; see Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916). In Rigsby, the Supreme
Court held that a railroad employee injured as a result of his employer's failure to comply
with the Federal Safety Appliance Act could sue for damages under that statute, even
though the statute explicitly did not provide a remedy. 241 U.S. at 39-40. The Rigsby Court
analyzed whether the statute created a federal right in favor of the plaintiff, and concluded
that Congress enacted the statute to protect a particular class of people and that the plain-
tiff was a member of that class. Id. In Cort, the Court stated that no demonstration of
legislative intent to create a remedy is necessary when the plaintiffs are the especial
beneficiaries of the statute although explicit legislative intent to deny a remedy is control-
ling. 422 U.S. at 81-82. The statute in Cort, however, did not envision the protection of
corporate shareholders. Id. at 80. The Court thus rejected the Cort plaintiffs argument
that the statute created a private right of action. Id. at 82. See generally Frankel, Implied
Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REv. 553, 555 (1981).
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tent exists, implicitly or explicitly, either to create or deny a right of
action.74 Third, a court should evaluate whether the implication of a remedy
for the plaintiff is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative
schemes.7 5 Finally, a court must question whether the cause of action is
one traditionally relegated to state law, rendering a cause of action based
solely on federal law inappropriate.
7
1
In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court continued to employ the
four-part Cort test in restricting the implication of implied remedies.' The
Court further constricted the approach to implied rights of action in Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington.78 The Touche Ross Court substantially modified
the Cort analytical framework by indicating that the implication of a
private right of action depended solely on congressional intent.79 The Court
determined that the four components of the Cort test do not possess equal
authority.' Although the Touche Ross Court examined the first three Cort
factors as nominally relevant indicia to determine whether an implied right
of action exists under Section 17(a) of the '34 Act, the Touche Ross Court
actually relied exclusively on the first two factors. 1 The Court concluded
that, absent positive results from an analysis of the first two Cort factors,
a court could conclude Congress did not intend to imply a right of action
1, 422 U.S. at 78; see National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n. of R.R. Passengers
(Amtrak), 414 U.S. 453, 458, 460 (1974) (court will infer private cause of action only if consis-
tent with legislative intent).
15 422 U.S. at 78; see Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412,
423 (1975) (private enforcement necessary to effectuate broad remedial purposes of statute).
11 422 U.S. at 78; see Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963) (state law governs
cause of action for damages due to federal officials' abuse of power); cf. J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964) (federal law appeared applicable after evaluation of both
federal and state law).
See, e.g., Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 (1979) (Cort analysis resulted in denial
of private right of action under Trade Secrets Act); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49, 61 (1978) (Cort analysis determined no implied remedy under Indian Civil Rights
Act); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 24 (1977) (Court denied implied private right
of action under S 14(e) of '34 Act after applying Cort analysis).
" 442 U.S. 560 (1979). In Touche Ross, the plaintiff argued for the implication of a private
action under S 17(a) of the '34 Act. Id. at 568; see 15 U.S.C. S 78q(a) (1976) (5 17(a)). The
Touche Ross decision illustrated the views propounded by Justice Powell's dissent in Can-
non v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 740 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). 442 U.S. at
561-69. The Cannon dissent argued the Cort test was contrary to the principles embodied
in article III of the United States Constitution. 441 U.S. at 743; see U.S. CONST. art. III.
Justice Powell suggested that through the judicial implication of remedies, courts of limited
jurisdiction unjustly extend their authority without congressonal approval. 441 U.S. at 746.
11 442 U.S. at 568. The Touche Ross Court modified the Cort analysis into a two-tier
inquiry. Id. at 575; see supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (Cort analysis). Initially,
a court should discern the appropriate legislative intent surrounding a statute. 442 U.S.
at 575. The second tier requires a court to inquire whether federal or state law is applicable.
Id. In Touche Ross, since the Court perceived no requisite congressional intent in a first-
level analysis, the Court did not engage in the second level of inquiry. Id
' 442 U.S. at 568-75.
"I Id. at 576; see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79-83 (1975) (first and second Cort factors
involve membership of plaintiff in protected class and legislative history); supra notes 71-76
and accompanying text (discussion of Cort decision).
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under section 17(a),' rendering consideration of the third and fourth prongs
of the Cort analysis unnecessary."
The Supreme Court continued to restrict implied remedies by fur-
ther narrowing the Cart test in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis.' The Transamerica Court determined that the central inquiry in
whether to imply a right of action is congressional intent.15 The Court
applied the standards established in Touche Ross to conclude that an im-
plied right of action existed under section 215, but not under section 206
of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.86 In deciding whether to infer
a right of action, the Transamerica Court emphasized the primacy of
legislative intent and began its analysis by focusing on the second factor
of the Cort test. 7 The Court, however, subdivided the second Cort factor
into two elements to consider both legislative history and statutory
language.u Since neither the legislative history nor the statutory language
evidenced adequate congressional intent to imply a remedy, the Trans-
america Court concluded that the plaintiff could not proceed under a sec-
tion 206 implied remedy. 9 Yet, the Court stated that when a statute does
satisfy the modified second factor of the Cort test, the inquiry should ex-
tend to the third Cort factor to examine whether inferring a remedy under
the statute would comport with the general legislative scheme. Although
the fourth Cort factor exists as a part of the analysis, the Transamerica
Court suggested that courts did not have to consider the fourth factor
when an application of prior factors evinces an absence of congressional
intent to create an implied remedy.9 Consequently, the Court in Trans-
america reorganized the Cort framework to produce a more restrictive
test for inferring causes of action, relying ultimately on the express in-
tent of Congress.2
442 U.S. at 575-76. The Touche Ross Court concluded that courts should not imply
private rights of action without sufficient congressional intent indicating the propriety of
inferring a remedy. Id. at 574. The Court recognized that a contrary position would sanc-
tion judicial incursions into the realm of the legislature. Id. at 577-79.
"Id. at 575-76; see Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal Law,
55 NoTRE DAME LAW. 33,49 (1979) (interpretation of Touche Ross decision as establishing three-
prong modified Cort analysis for inferring private right of action).




Id. Although the second Cort factor focused exclusively on the legislative history
of a statute, the Transamerica Court expanded the second factor to consider the language
of the statute and the circumstances surrounding its enactment. Id. at 18; see Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. at 78.
444 U.S. at 23-24.
9 Id.
" Id In its implication analysis, the Touche Ross Court considered the first Cort factor
as tangential, citing instead the intent of Congress as the dispositive issue in determining
whether to create an implied remedy. Id. at 24.
' See infra text accompanying notes 93-96 (status of implication analysis after Trans-
america decision).
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The current status of the implication analysis has evolved from Touche
Ross and Transamerica, which effectively narrowed the Cort test into a
two-prong standard.9" Courts should examine whether sufficient evidence
of legislative intent exists to support the implication of a remedy. 4 The
indicia providing reliable evidence of legislative intent include statutory
language, legislative analysis, and the overall legislative scheme.95 Then,
if the legislative intent analysis shows Congress amenable to an implied
remedy, the court should employ the fourth Cort factor to determine
whether state law provides an appropriate remedy, and, if so, the court
should defer to the existing remedy.96
Although a skeletal framework of the Cort implication analysis still
exists, more recent cases reflect the Court's increasing emphasis on the
intent of the legislature.9" Moreover, the presence of express remedies
poses additional considerations in employing the modified implication
analysis.98 Basing its reasoning on the old apothegm of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius,99 the Supreme Court in Touche Ross evidenced ex-
treme reluctance to imply a remedy when an express remedy already ex-
isted to control the same conduct."' ° In Touche Ross, the Court reasoned
that Congress well could have provided a private damages remedy under
section 17(a) of the '34 Act."1 Since Congress manifested no intent to supply
" See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1976).
" See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1979). The
Transamerica Court stated that the Cort factors were relevant in determining whether
a private remedy was implicit in a statute, but nonetheless the Court concluded that the
central inquiry was whether Congress intended to create such a right of action. Id.; see
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78.
444 U.S. at 24.
442 U.S. at 575-76.
See Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n., 453 U.S. 1,
13 (1981). In Middlesex, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant damaged fishing grounds
through discharges and ocean dumping of sewage and other waste. Id. at 4-5. The Court
noted that the primary consideration in determining whether to infer a right of action is
the intent of the legislature. Id. As part of the inquiry into legislative intent, the Middlesex
Court relied on the statutory language, particularly the provision made therein for enforce-
ment and relief. Id. at 13-14. Additionally, the Court reviewed the legislative history and
other traditional aids of statutory interpretation such as judicial precedent and circumstances
surrounding the enactment to determine congressional intent. Id.
" See infra text accompanying notes 99-104 (exploring relationship between express
remedies and modified implication analysis).
" National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,
458 (1974) (explaining expressio maxim); see supra, note 70 (discussion of expressio maxim).
1" See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 574 (1979). The Touche Ross Court
stated that when an express civil remedy exists, courts should show extreme reluctance
to imply a cause of action significantly broader than the remedy that Congress chose to
provide. Id.; see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 US. 723, 735-36 (1975).
The Court in Blue Chip described as anomalous the imputation to Congress of an intention
to expand the class of plaintiffs for an implied cause of action beyond the bounds Congress
delineated for comparable express causes of action. Id. at 736.
01 442 U.S. at 572.
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an implied right of action, the Court concluded that the existence of an
express remedy, with its substantive requirements and restrictions,
prompted the rejection of an implied remedy."2 The Transamerica Court
echoed the reasoning of the Touche Ross Court stating that when a statute
provides a particular remedy, a court should be cautious in substituting
other remedies for an express right of action.0 ' The Supreme Court thus
appears chary in implying rights of action despite the existence of an ex-
press remedy." Considering that the Court's implication analysis focuses
primarily on legislative intent, the Court presumably views express liabil-
ity provisions as a manifestation of Congress' intent to provide an ex-
clusive cause of action.10 5 Consequently, when an express remedy is pre-
sent, courts should exercise extreme caution in enforcing an implied right
of action.
In Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean,' ' the Supreme Court recently
examined a situation involving the overlap of an express remedy with
an implied cause of action under section 10(b). The Huddleston Court con-
cluded that the availability of an express remedy under Section 11 of the
'33 Act did not preclude defrauded purchasers of registered securities
from maintaining an implied action under section 10(b). 17 The Huddleston
plaintiffs, purchasers of registered securities, sued under section 10(b),
alleging that the corporate directors of Texas International Speedway,
Inc. and its accounting firm engaged in a fraudulent scheme to misrepre-
sent material information in a registration statement and prospectus
regarding the financial condition of Texas International."' Both the district
court and the Fifth Circuit held for the plaintiffs, concluding that an im-
plied remedy under section 10(b) for fraudulent misrepresentation in a
registration statement was appropriate notwithstanding the presence of
102 442 U.S. at 577-78.
103 Id. at 574; Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1978)
(courts should exercise caution in reading other implied remedies into statutes expressly
providing remedy).
1"4 444 U.S. at 19-20.
105 Id.
104 51 U.S.L.W. 4099 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1983).
1 Id. at 4102-03. In Huddleston, the Supreme Court clarified the proper standard of
proof in private actions under the securities laws. Id. at 4103. The Court held that persons
seeking recovery under § 10(b) must prove their cause of action by a preponderance of
the evidence, and not by clear and convincing evidence. Id. The Supreme Court addressed
the issue because the Fifth Circuit applied an improper standard of proof. Id. The Hud-
dleston Court noted that private actions under the securities laws consistently adhere to
the preponderance standard. Id.; cf. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 355
(1943) (preponderance of evidence suffices to establish fraud under 5 17(a) of '33 Act). See
generally Loss, supra note 14, at 1435.
1 0 51 U.S.L.W. at 4100. In Huddleston, the defendant Texas International Speedway,
Inc., filed a registration statement and prospectus with the SEC for the sale of securities
to the public. Id. The defendants earmarked the proceeds of the sale to finance the constru-
tion of an automobile speedway. Id. Texas International Speedway, Inc., however, did not
meet with success and filed a petition for bankruptcy. Id.
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an express remedy governing the same conduct under section 11 of the
'33 Act."9
On appeal, the Supreme Court reasoned that Congress did not intend
to deny an implied remedy under section 10(b) even though an express
remedy was available.' The Supreme Court, however, declined to employ
the modified implication analysis, relying instead on a "nullification" test
to reconcile an express remedy under section 11 with the presence of a
section 10(b) implied right of action."' Moreover, since the existence of
an implied remedy under section 10(b) was simply beyond doubt, the Court
neglected to analyze the implication of a right of action under section
10(b)."2 Recognizing that the courts consistently had implied a cause of
action under section 10(b), the Huddleston Court examined the exclusiv-
ity of an express remedy under section 11, considering the presence of
an implied remedy under section 10(b)."'
As part of the nullification analysis, the Huddleston Court evaluated
whether an implied remedy under section 10(b) would circumvent the
carefully drawn procedural restrictions.surrounding express remedies such
as section 11."' The Court feared that preference for an implied remedy
despite the availability of an express remedy would nullify the procedural
and substantive limitations on the express remedy.u5 Yet, the Huddleston
Court recognized that the additional burden of proving scienter in a sec-
tion 10(b) action allowed no substantive advantages to plaintiffs proceeding
under section 10(b) rather than under the express remedy of section 11.116
The Court stated that section 11 attaches absolute liability against the
109 Id.
Ilo Id. at 4101-02,
11 See infra text accompanying notes 114-19 (examination of Huddleston Court's nullifica-
tion analysis).
1 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (existence of private cause
of action for violations of S 10(b) is well established); see also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers
Life & Cas, Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). In Superintendent, the Court confirmed the ex-
istence of an implied private right of action under S 10(b) without extended discussion. Id.;
see supra note 6 (evolution of implied rights of action under federal statutes).
1 51 U.S.L.W, at 4101-02.
M Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 38-40 (requirements and limitations surround-
ing § 11 of '33 Act).
115 Id.; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 (1976). In Hochfelder, the Court
stated that the procedural limitations on the express remedies of the '33 and '34 Act in-
dicate that courts cannot extend an implied S 10(b) remedy to actions premised on negligent
wrongdoing. Id.
"1 51 U.S.L.W. at 4102, The Huddleston Court determined that the heavier burden of
proof required under S 10(b) preserved the integrity of the procedural restrictions surround-
ing the express remedies. Id. The Court feared that plaintiffs would circumvent the pro-
cedural limitations of the express remedies by invoking S 10(b), thus flooding the courts
with possibly vexatious litigation. Id. The Huddleston Court reasoned that the S 10(b) re-
quirement of scienter, rather than mere negligence, would prevent plaintiffs from freely
nullifying the procedural restrictions of the express remedies by proceeding under the
broader, more flexible S 10(b) implied remedy. Id.
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issuer if the plaintiff proves even innocent material misstatements.'17 In
contrast, section 10(b) imposes a significantly heavier burden of proof
because the plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted with
scienter1ls The Huddleston Court determined that the additional burden
in proving a cause of action under section 10(b) justified the application
of a section 10(b) implied remedy even when section 11 governed the same
actionable conduct,119
The Huddleston Court also reasoned that the overlap of remedies was
neither unusual nor unfortunate." In considering the broad, catchall nature
of section 10(b), the Court recognized the inevitability that certain ex-
press provisions would govern conduct also actionable under section 10.121
Specifically, section 11 applies to material misrepresentations or omissions
in registration statements" and section 10(b) prohibits any manipulative
or deceptive device in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security."' Since each provision redresses different misconduct, the Hud-
dleston Court decided not to provide an exception under section 10(b) for
fraud occurring in a registration statement simply because section 11 sup-
plied an express remedy addressing the same actionable conduct. 4
In permitting an implied remedy under section 10(b) notwithstanding
an express remedy, the Court employed an analysis of legislative intent
in addition to the nullification test, indicating that legislative intent ap-
parently remains an appropriate guideline in cases involving an overlap
of remedies,.25 Abandoning the modified Cort test, the Court focused
"I See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (express liability provision under S
11 of '33 Act).
1,I See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976); supra note 27 (scienter
requirement).
" 51 U.S.L.W. at 4102.
Id. at 4101; see SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468 (1968) (Court recognized
that 5 10(b) and proxy rules under § 14 of '34 Act may overlap to govern similar types
of misconduct); see also Fleischer, Federal Corporation Law: An Assessment, 78 HARV, L.
REV. 1146,1158 (1965). The author states that the expressio maxim, which precludes overlap-
ping remedies, is inapposite under the federal securities laws when discussing the interac-
tion of § 10(b) and S 18(a) of the '34 Act because of the broad remedial purposes of the
securities laws, particularly S 10(b). Id, But see Comment, The National Securities Case:
The Supreme Court and Rule 105.5, 69 COLUm. L. REV. 906,916-18 (1969) (criticizing Supreme
Court for not carefully considering ramifications of National Securities decision permitting
overlap of remedies).
2 51 U.S.L.W. at 4101; see United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778 (1979) (applying
S 17(a) of '33 Act to conduct also prohibited under S 10(b) in SEC action). The Naftalin Court
recognized that the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act would cover some of
the same conduct. Id.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 38-40 (discussion of S 11 of '33 Act).
12 See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussion of element of S 10(b) cause
of action concerning manipulative or deceptive devices).
12 51 U.S.L.W. at 4101; of. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375, 390-91 (1970) (ex-
istence of express provisions for recovery of attorney's fees in S 9(e) and 18(a) of '34 Act
does not preclude award of attorney's fees under § 14(a) of '34 Act).
"2 See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (current status of implication analysis).
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primarily on the general legislative purpose, formerly the third factor in
the Cort implication analysis, to discern the intent of the legislature.12
The Huddleston Court reasoned that Congress formulated the securities
laws to make regulation reasonably complete and effective." In addition,
the Court stated that the remedies within the securities laws deserve
a cumulative construction in view of the broad remedial purpose behind
the Acts.'28 The Court also dismissed the application of the exclusio maxim
of statutory construction, explaining that a presumption of exclusivity
would undermine the remedial purpose of the Acts. 9
In exploring the legislative intent further, the Huddleston Court cited
Congress' comprehensive revision of the securities laws in 1975 to illustrate
the notion that Congress declined to countermand the implication of a
section 10(b) right of action by the courts despite the presence of express
remedies." The Court reasoned that since courts consistently allowed im-
plied remedies under section 10(b) even when express remedies were
available, Congress' decision to leave section 10(b) unaltered indicated that
Congress, while cognizant of such judicial interpretation, affirmed the
cumulative construction of section 10(b)."3 1 Rather than determine whether
... 51 U.S.L.W. at 4102.
12 Id.; see 15 U.S.C. S 78b (1976) (provisions regulating control of securities); see also
S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934) (broad remedial purpose behind securities laws).
1 51 U.S.L.W. at 4102; see Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978). Congress'
decision to leave S 7(b) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1968 intact after
sweeping amendments suggests that Congress ratified the cumulative nature of the provi-
sions contained in the '33 and '34 Acts.
" 51 U.S.L.W. at 4102 n.23. In rejecting the application of the expressio maxim, the
Huddleston Court stated that the maxim is inappropriate in a situation in which remedies
redress different misconduct and when a presumption of exclusivity would undermine the
remedial purposes of the act. Id.; see Note, supra note 6, at 290-91 (expressio maxim is subor-
dinate to overall purpose of Act and unsafe as general rule of construction).
" 51 U.S.L.W. at 4102; see Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29,
89 Stat. 97, 98 (1975). In 1975, Congress enacted the most substantial and significant revi-
sion of the federal securities laws since the passage of the '34 Act. See Securities Acts Amend-
ments of 1975: Hearings on S.249 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, S. REP. No. 75,94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975), reprinted
in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 179. As the conference report on the legislation ex-
plained, the 1975 amendments represented the most searching re-examination of the com-
petitive, statutory, and economic issues facing the securities markets, the securities industry,
and public investors since the 1930's. H.R. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 91, reprinted in
1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 332. See generally Block & Barton, Implied Private Damage
Action Under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 270, 273 (1982) (evaluation of
amendments of securities laws).
131 51 U.S.L.W. at 4102. Since the 1975 amendments to the securities laws, the lower
courts have continued to recognize that an implied cause of action under S 10(b) is available
despite the existence of express remedies. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National
Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342, 354-59 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (implied S 10(b) remedy available
for conduct proscribed by §§ 11 and 12 of '33 Act and S 18 of '34 Act), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 954 (1981); Ross v. A.H. Robbins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 551-56 (2d Cir. 1979) (§ 18 of '34
Act does not preclude implication of S 10(b) private right of action), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
946 (1980).
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Congress intended to create an implied remedy under section 10(b) in view
of express remedies, the Court searched for evidence of a legislative in-
tent to deny an implied cause of action, concluding that the exclusivity
of express liability provisions was inappropriate."n
The Supreme Court's approach in Huddleston provides an example
of judicial policymaking. The Court summarily acquiesced in the existence
of an implied remedy under section 10(b) and failed to apply the modified
implication analysis adopted in Touche Ross to ascertain the propriety of
an implied cause of action.I" Instead, the Court relied on the historical
significance of section 10(b) and the consistent implication of a private
cause of action by the lower courts as evidence of the viability of an im-
plied section 10(b) remedy despite an express remedy.13 In departing from
a traditional analysis of legislative intent under the Cort test, the Hud-
dleston Court relied on a nullification approach, determining that an im-
plied remedy under section 10(b) would not negate the effectiveness of
the procedural restrictions surrounding the express remedies.' By employ-
ing the nullification methodology, the Court failed to evaluate meticulously
the legislative history of the statutes involved." In addition, the Supreme
Court neglected to ascertain the plaintiffs status as an intended beneficiary
of the statute as part of the first factor in the modified Cort analysis.
137
Prior Supreme Court decisions suggested that legislative history and the
plaintiffs status were vital elements comprising the legislative intent
analysis."s The Huddleston Court, however, emphasized the overall
legislative scheme in employing the nullification analysis as an illustra-
tion of Congress' intent to permit the application of an implied remedy
notwithstanding an express remedy in section 11." Since recent Supreme
Court decisions demonstrate an exclusive focus on legislative intent,14 the
Court seems prone to venture beyond the confines of the modified Cort
13 51 U.S.L.W. at 4101-02.
133 Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 93-96 (status of implication analysis after
Touche Ross).
1u 51 U.S.L.W. at 4101; see supra note 6 (historically, courts consistently implied private
right of action under § 10(b).
' 51 U.S.L.W. at 4101; see supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text (nullification
analysis employed by Huddeston Court).
11 51 U.S.L.W. at 4101.
13 Id.; see supra notes 93 & 94 and accompanying text (modified first factor of Cort
analysis).
11 See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979). In Cannon, the
Court suggested that if a plaintiff satisfies the first Cort factor, then proof of the second
factor, congressional intent to create a remedy, possibly is unnecessary. Id.; see also Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-77 (1979). The Touche Ross Court emphasized
the primacy of determining whether Congress intended to create a private right of action. Id.
' 51 U.S.L.W. at 4101-02.
E.g., Galifornia v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 296 (1981) (ultimate issue in inferring
remedy is congressional intent); Universities Research Ass'n. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 763
(1981) (same).
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analysis, examining aspects of nullification and congressional amendments.
The Huddleston Court also relied on the 1975 securities amendments
to show that Congress implicitly sanctioned the inference of a section 10(b)
remedy by leaving section 10(b) intact."' The Court's analysis is ques-
tionable considering the misplaced reliance on the intent of Congress in
1975 rather than the intent of Congress during the formulation of the
Acts,"' Depending on the inaction of a subsequent Congress to establish
the intent of the enacting Congress seems tenuous,"4 especially sifnce the
1975 amendments to the securities laws dealt with particular areas of
legislative concern and not with any re-examination of the private enforce-
ment mechanisms of the Acts.11 The Supreme Court applied a similar
analysis of congressional inaction in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
v. Curran,"' determining that a pre-existing implied private action under
the Commodity Exchange Act withstood subsequent congressional
amendment." 6 The Curran Court reasoned that since Congress had
previously amended the Act without expressly disapproving of the ex-
isting implied remedy, Congress must have intended to perpetuate a
private cause of action."47 The Curran Court considered relevant amend-
ments involving only the private remedies under the Commodity Exchange
Act."8 In contrast, the Court in Huddleston examined amendments not
"1 51 U.S.L.W. at 4102; see supra note 130 (describing amendments to securities laws).
... See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 574 n.16 (1976). The intent of
the present Congress is significant only to the degree that Congress could enact an express
right of action upon perceiving a judicial denial of an implied remedy as inappropriate.
Id. at 578.
"I See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 64 (1978) (implying private right
of action on basis of congressional silence is hazardous undertaking).
144 See supra note 130 (detailing amendments to securities laws).
"1 456 U.S. 353 (1982); see infra text accompanying notes 147 & 148 (explanation of
Curran decision).
148 See infra text accompanying notes 147 & 148 (explanation of Curran decision).
1 456 U.S. at 378-82. In Cur-ran, the Court relied on the ostensibly uniform and well-
understood consensus that a private cause of action exists under the Commodity Exchange
Act in justifying an implied remedy. Id. at 379-81; see 7 U.S.C. SS 1-7(d) (1976 & Supp. V
1981) (provisions of Commodity Exchange Act). The Supreme Court employed similar reason-
ing in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975), asserting that an
implied action existed under S 10(b) considering the overwhelming consensus among the
district and appellate courts that such a cause of action did exist. Id.
1 8 456 U.S. at 379-80. Traditionally, the Supreme Court has considered whether Con-
gress had intended to create or deny a remedy under a particular statute in determining
whether to imply a cause of action. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78-79; supra notes 73-76
and accompanying text (discussion of Cort analysis for implication of remedies). Notwithstan-
ding the Curran decision, the Supreme Court altered the focus on legislative intent, deter-
mining that a court must reject an implied cause of action unless Congress affirmatively
intended to create one. See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 296 (1981) (ultimate
issue is whether Congress intended to create private right of action); Universities Research
Ass'n. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 763 (1981) (question whether statute creates, private right
of action is ultimately one of congressional intent). The Curran Court employed a converse
approach in evaluating congressional amendments as part of the legislative history to infer
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pertaining specifically to the implication of private rights of action under
section 10(b).149 Considering the underlying disparity in the substantive
content of the securities amendments, the Huddleston Court fallaciously
relied on the inaction of Congress as evidence of permitting an implied
remedy under section 10(b) despite the existence of an express remedy.
The Huddleston Court's reliance on the heavier burden of proof for
section 10(b) as a justification for allowing plaintiffs capable of proving
scienter to proceed under section 10(b) rather than under an express
remedy is also subject to criticism." The burden of demonstrating that
the defendant acted with scienter actually does not limit the potential
invocation of section 10(b).151 Courts generally permit an allegation of some
element of scienter to satisfy the burden of proof.' -' Although the Supreme
Court has left the question unresolved, courts typically acknowledge that
a showing of recklessness comports with the scienter requirement.' If
recklessness is sufficient to establish scienter, the burden placed on the
a cause of action. 456 U.S. at 379-80. The Court reasoned that since no evidence resulted
from an analysis of the legislative history that Congress intended to deny a remedy, the
existence of an implied remedy under the Commodity Exchange Act remained intact. Id.;
see Block & Barton, supra, note 130, at 273 (examination of effects of Curran decision). The
Supreme Court's reasoning in Curran illustrates a form of judicial policy-making in which
the Court views the circumstances and adopts the legislative intent analysis to suit the
desired outcome. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 147. But see Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 64 (1978) (implying private right of action on basis of congressional
silence is hazardous undertaking).
149 51 U.S.L.W. at 4102. In Curran, the 1974 amendments to the Commodity Exchange
Act dealt extensively with private remedies under the Commodity Exchange Act. 456 U.S.
at 365-66. In contrast, the relevant securities amendments to the '33 and '34 Acts dealt
with particular areas of legislative concern and did not involve any re-examination of the
private enforcement mechanisms of the securities acts. See supra note 130 (describing amend-
ments to securities laws). The Huddleston Court justified the existence of an implied 5 10(b)
remedy notwithstanding express remedies by relying on congressional inaction regarding
S 10(b) in amending the securities laws. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4102. The Court's reasoning is flawed
in that Congress amended legislation not pertaining directly to S 10b. See Securities Act
Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (1975 amendments did not change
§ 10(b)). Thus, the Court's reliance on Congress' leaving S 10(b) intact as an indication of
congressional approval of an implied action under S 10(b) is misplaced. See supra note 147
(discussion of reliance on congressional approval due to congressional silence).
1 See supra text accompanying notes 116 & 118 (discussion of heavier burden of proof
under S 10(b) than under express remedies).
"I1 See Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1228, 1251 (D. Del. 1978) (scienter require-
ment fulfilled by defendant's actual knowledge of undisclosed information). See generally
Note, The Exclusivity of the Express Remedy Under Section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 845, 856-57 (1978).
12 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 201 (S 10(b) regulates practices that in-
volve some element of scienter); see Rolf v. Blythe, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44-47
(2d Cir.) (reckless behavior sufficient to meet scienter requirement), cert. denied 439 U.S.
1039 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977) (same).
"I See BLOOMENTHAL. supra note 38, S 12.04, at 212-14 (discussion of scienter requirement
considering courts' acceptance of recklessness as satisfying scienter rule).
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plaintiff is arguably not much greater than requiring the plaintiff to prove
negligence." Furthermore, the absence of an express statute of limita-
tions period for section 10(b) as well as the lack of specific provisions under
section 10(b) requiring imposition of security for costs and attorney's fees
benefit plaintiffs. 155 Since express remedies stipulate detailed procedural
restrictions, plaintiffs proceeding under section 10(b) enjoy a comparable
dearth of procedural limitations.'
Despite the broad applicability of an implied remedy under section
10(b), certain limitations surround the statute to deter unrestrained, vex-
atious litigation.'57 A particularly effective limitation on a section 10(b)
implied cause of action is the purchaser-seller requirement, which courts
implement to control the class of plaintiffs suing under section 10(b).'
Although the Supreme Court has held that a private damage action under
section 10(b) is available only to actual purchasers or sellers of securities,
the Court has not specified the precise elements involved in a purchase
or sale. 59 Consequently, courts can expand or contract the category of
purchasers and sellers through liberal or narrow interpretations of the
definition of a purchase or sale."5 For example, the Supreme Court has
1" See Note, Prospectus Liability and Rule lOb-5: A Sequel to BarChris, 1971 DUKE L.J.
559, 564 n.20 (author speculates that in many situations negligence is established less easily
than fraudulent intent). The author hypothesizes that when a defendant exercises due care
in preparing a registration statement, but realizes beforehand the statement is misleading,
the defendant's intent to defraud is clear. Id. Proving the defendant's negligence, however,
seems difficult in such a situation. Id.
155 See supra notes 33 & 34 and accompanying text (statute of limitations and security
requirement under § 10(b)).
15 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (examples of limitations surrounding S
10(b)).
157 See supra text accompanying note 8; infra text accompanying notes 158-85 (discus-
sion of purchaser-seller requirement of § 10(b)).
1 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975). In Blue
Chip, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant-corporation distributed an overly pessimistic
prospectus attempting to mislead and discourage investors from purchasing the corpora-
tion's stock. Id. at 726-27. The Blue Chip Court ruled that allowing potential investors,
disgruntled by the market performance of stocks, to file a S 10(b) claim alleging inadequate
disclosure, for example, would circumvent the essential purpose of the antifraud legislation
by expanding the class of plaintiffs to include people Congress did not intend to protect.
Id. at 747. The Blue Chip decision established a uniform standard, defining the class of
plaintiffs permitted to proceed under § 10(b), which Congress designed to curtail the in-
creasing exceptions to the purchaser-seller rule. Id. at 754-55. Several exceptions to the
purchaser-seller requirement emerged in federal courts before the decision in Blue Chip.
See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 754 (5th Cir. 1974) (injunctive relief excep-
tions to purchaser-seller rule); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 801 (5th Cir. 1970) (derivative
shareholder actions exceptions to purchaser-seller rule).
159 See The Circuits Debate, supra note 11, at 888. (Supreme Court in Blue Chip failed
to articulate elements of purchase or sale).
1 Compare Rochelle v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 535 F.2d 523, 527-28 (9th Cir.
1976) (issuance of shares of corporation qualifies as sale) and Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Com-
monwealth Edison Co., 451 F. Supp. 602, 608 (S.D. Ill. 1978) (issuance and later redemption
of stocks deemed purchase and sale), affjd 598 F.2d 1109, cert. denied 444 U.S. 900 (1979),
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concluded that the purchaser-seller requirement precludes retention claims,
which involve an assertion that the defendant fraudulently dissuaded the
plaintiff from selling a security, thus inducing the plaintiff to retain the
devalued security.16' Similarly, the Fourth Circuit applied the purchaser-
seller requirement under section 10(b) in Gurley v. Documentation, Inc.,'6
to deny standing to shareholders alleging that the defendants had
discouraged the shareholders from selling certain securities through
fraudulent inducement." In Gurley, the plaintiffs initially bought Documen-
tation, Inc. stock in reliance on the corporate directors' assurance that
the plaintiffs as shareholders could sell their shares in conjunction with
any future public offering of Documentation, Inc. stock.11 When Documen-
tation, Inc. planned a public offering of stock, however, the corporate direc-
tors decided to support the price of the new issue artificially by temporarily
preventing the plaintiffs from putting their shares on the market.65 The
plaintiffs' complaint alleged that Documentation, Inc. fraudulently
prevented the plaintiffs from selling their shares until a specified time
after the initial public offering of stocks."
In categorizing the plaintiffs' complaint as a deferred sale claim, the
Gurley Court determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under
section 10(b) because the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the purchaser-seller
requirement.6 ' The Gurley Court recognized that the rationale for impos-
ing a purchaser-seller requirement centers on reducing nuisance suits
under section 10(b)"68 and noted that like retention claims, deferred sale
with Sacks v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 593 F.2d 1234, 1234-41 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (custodial transfer
of stock from one broker to another while ownership rights remain in same investor is
not purchase or sale).
421 U.S. at 737-38. In Blue Chip, the Court explained that retention claims involve
shareholders who allege they decided not to sell their shares because of an unduly optimistic
representation or a failure to disclose unfavorable material. Id.
16 674 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1982).
163 Id. at 256-57.
16 Id. at 255.
Id. The Gurley plaintiffs informed the directors of Documentation, Inc. that the plain-
tiffs wanted to sell their shares in conjunction with any public offering of stock. Id. At
a shareholders' meeting, the directors informed the plaintiffs that the company contemplated
a public offering of stock sometime in the future. Id. The defendants, however, neglected
to tell the plaintiffs that plans for a public offering were well underway. Id.
1 Id.
.6, Id. at 256-57.
1' Id. at 257; see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-32 (1975).
The majority opinion in Blue Chip cited the general acceptance by the lower courts of the
Birnbaum rule as a consideration in maintaining the strict limitations surrounding the
purchaser-seller requirement under § 10(b). Id.; see Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193
F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). In addition, the majority opinion stated
that policy considerations such as the fear of strike suits and the danger of successful suits
based on spurious oral testimony prompted the Court to uphold a strict purchaser-seller
limitation. 421 U.S. at 737-45; see Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548-49 (1949). In
Cohen, the Court characterized strike suits as actions brought not to redress real wrongs,
but to cause a nuisance for the defendant. Id. In Blue Chip, the Court expressed concern
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claims expose defendants to potentially vexatious litigation.'69 In a defer-
red sale claim, the plaintiff usually alleges that the defendant's fraud
caused the plaintiff to sell his shares later than he otherwise would have
done.' ° To deter such claims and effectively limit the class of plaintiffs
invoking an implied section 10(b) remedy, the lower courts have fashioned
a test requiring that fraud exist prior to or contemporaneous with the
plaintiff's actual sale of securities.'" Since the crucial evidence in defer-
red sale claims, like retention claims, is the oral testimony of the plain-
tiffs, the ease of fabricating a plausible deferred sale claim raises the
danger of spurious strike suits.' The Fourth Circuit did recognize the
inherent unfairness of denying standing to sue on the Gurley plaintiff's
deferred sale claim, especially since the plaintiffs sold the shares soon
after the alleged fraud, but the Court refused to expand the purchaser-
seller rule.'
that vexatious litigation would increase if the Court abandoned the purchaser-seller rule.
421 U.S. at 740. The Court recognized the serious impediment to normal business activity
that any lawsuit engenders. I& The Court reasoned that, absent the purchaser-seller limita-
tion, the opportunity would arise for lawsuits to be initiated by persons not actively par-
ticipating in the marketing of securities, thus exposing companies to the danger of paying
large settlements to avoid expensive litigation. Id. at 739. The Blue Chip Court, in addition,
stated that the purchaser-seller rule injected a degree of clarity into the fact-finding pro-
cess by separating the group of plaintiffs who actually sold or purchased from the group
of potential plaintiffs capable of stating a claim, but not proving it. Id. at 743. The Blue
Chip Court also considered the degree of ambiguity involved when oral testimony is prac-
tically the entire basis of proof. Id. The Court recognized that abolition of the Birnbaum
doctrine would require the trier of fact to decide many hazy issues based almost exclu-
sively on oral testimony. Id. The danger of vexatious litigation, in view of potentially spurious
allegations, therefore, posed a serious detriment to the normal functioning of business. See
generally Dosley, The Effects of Civil Liability on Investment Banking and the New Issues
Market, 58 VA. L. REv. 776, 822-43 (1972).
1.9 674 F.2d at 257. The Gurley Court emphasized that the plaintiff's damages in con-
nection with an alleged fraud were completely speculative. Id. The Court explained that
the inherent danger of initiating spurious suits based solely on oral testimony outweighed
any advantages in allowing deferred sales claims. Id.; see O'Brien v. Continental Illinois
Nat'l. Bank & Trust, 593 F.2d 54, 58 (7th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff may not bring retention claims
by selling securities before filing suit).
70 674 F2d at 257.
171 See JACOBS, supra note 3, 5 38.01(e)(iii)(A). After Birnbaum, the lower courts created
several exceptions to the purchaser-seller rule. Id. One exception, the deferred sale claim,
has the potential to survive despite the holding in Blue Chip because the facts of Blue Chip
do not apply to the deferred sale exception. Id. Accordingly, a plaintiff can obtain standing
under this exception if he is on the verge of selling or, if, after learning of the fraud, he
subsequently sells or buys. Id.; see also Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., 376 F. Supp. 1154, 1174-75
(S.D. N.Y. 1974). In a deferred sale claim, the Ingenito Court noted that S 10(b) did not re-
quire that a sale immediately follow the alleged fraud, and held that since plaintiffs clearly
had indicated their intent to sell and subsequently completed their sales, the alleged fraud
directly related to the timing and circumstances of the sale, and accordingly stated a
10(b) claim. Id.
" See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 743; supra note 168.
173 Id. at 738-39; see Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for
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Although the application of the purchaser-seller requirement in Gurley
established that plaintiffs in deferred sale situations lack standing under
section 10(b), application of the purchaser-seller rule often produces less
harsh results.174 In Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. B & 0 Railroads Co.,17
for example, the Third Circuit held that debenture holders satisfied the
purchaser-seller requirementY.17  In Pittsburg Terminal, the plaintiffs,
holders of convertible debentures, 177 alleged that the defendants, direc-
tors of the B & 0 Railroad Co., wrongfully fixed the record date for the
distribution of stock dividends, thereby denying the plaintiffs the oppor-
tunity to convert the debentures into common stock and participate in
the dividend.178 The Third Circuit held that the option to redeem conver-
tible debentures for common stock was actually a contract to buy or sell
securities.7 9 The Third Circuit concluded that a contract to buy or sell
securities was a purchase or sale as described in section 10(b) and thus
bestowed the plaintiff with standing to sue."'
As the court in Pittsburgh Terminal determined, the existence of a
contractual relationship was essential in extending the definition of the
purchaser-seller requirement to include convertible debentures.' An op-
tional contract to purchase or sell securities, as opposed to the actual pur-
chase or sale of securities as enunciated in the '34 Act, also satisfies the
purchaser-seller rule.' Though the Supreme Court's definition of a sale
Rule lob-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268, 275-76 (1968) (barring deferred sale claims under S 10(b)
eliminates number of meritorious claims).
"I See Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978, 981-82 (6th Cir. 1976) (deferred sale ac-
tionable under S 10(b) since sale occurred soon after alleged fraud), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
954 (1977).
171 680 F.2d 933 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 476 (1982).
176 Id.
17 Id. In Pittsburgh Terminal, the plaintiffs, Pittsburgh Terminal Corporation and four
individual shareholders, held convertible debentures issued by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
Company. Id. at 935-36.
I Id. In Pittsburgh Terminal, the defendants refrained from informing the plaintiffs
of the dividends because if the number of Baltimore & Ohio Railroad common stockholders
was to increase dramatically, Baltimore & Ohio would have had to file a registration state-
ment with the SEC. Id. at 937-38. The directors of Baltimore & Ohio feared that the prepara-
tion of a registration statement would entail numerous practical difficulties. Id.; see 15 U.S.C.
77f (1976) (requirements for filing of registration statement).
17 See 509 F. Supp. 1002, 1012 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (district court opinion in Pittsburgh Ter-
minal), affed in part and rev'd in part 680 F.2d 933 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 476 (1981).
"' 680 F.2d 933, 940 (3d Cir. 1982); see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 751 (1975). In Blue Chip, the Supreme Court found that the holders of contractual
rights or duties to purchase or sell securities achieved purchaser or seller status for the
purposes of § 10(b). Id.; see supra note 168 (examination of Blue Chip decision).
181 680 F.2d 933, 939-40 (3d Cir. 1982).
'= See Wulc v. Gulf & W. Indus., 400 F. Supp. 98, 102 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (optional contract
to purchase or sell securities complied with purchaser-seller requirement); Ashton v. Thornley
Realty Co., 346 F. Supp. 1294, 1299 n.4 (S.D. N.Y. 1972) (same), affd, 471 F.2d 746 (2d Cir.
1973); Collins v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282, 1289 (D. Mass. 1972) (same).
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contemplated individual transfers of property, the growing complexity
of securities coupled with the waning of face-to-face transactions suggests
that a broader, less mechanistic approach to interpreting the purchaser-
seller rule is expedient.""
The judicial confusion surrounding the purchaser-seller rule has yielded
inconsistent holdings. The purchaser-seller requirement remains an effec-
tive means of limiting the availability of an implied right of action under
section 10(b), even though the rule retains many exceptions. 8 5 Since Con-
gress failed to identify explicitly an implied remedy under section 10(b),
courts must employ judicially developed restraints to prevent vexatious
litigation under the statute because section 10(b) is broader and more ap-
pealing to litigants than the alternative express remedies.
Despite the availability of express remedies under the '33 and '34 Acts,
the Huddleston decision conclusively established that courts will continue
to exercise pragmatism in allowing a section 10(b) implied remedy with
appropriate limitations. 8 ' Theoretically, the Huddleston Court failed to
apply the current modified implication analysis; however, the Court em-
phatically recognized that section 10(b) was too important and well en-
trenched a remedy in the overall scheme of securities litigation to
eliminate.187 Since courts consistently have acknowledged an implied
remedy under section 10(b), the Huddleston decision merely approved ex-
pressly a practice in which courts have engaged for many years.'88
The Supreme Court resolved the conflict between express remedies
and an implied remedy under section 10(b) through an examination of con-
gressional intent.'89 In drafting the '33 and '34 Acts, the general intent
of Congress was to eliminate unfair and fraudulent practices in the
securities markets. "' An implied remedy under section 10(b) is a signifi-
cant means for aggrieved parties to redress fraud in the market place. 9'
If courts abrogated an implied cause of action under section 10(b), leaving
plaintiffs with only the narrow express remedies of the Acts, the likelihood
"I See Froehlich & Spiegel, Standing of Federal Securities Plaintiffs-Which Way The
Trend, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 510, 514 (1975). The authors suggest that a re-evaluation of the
purchaser-seller rule is necessary because of inconsistencies in application and results. Id.
The authors consider a case-by-case examination of the facts essential to the proper opera-
tion' of the purchaser-seller requirement. Id.
I"' See supra text accompanying notes 59-64 (describing S 10(b) as attractive remedy
compared to express remedies).
' See supra notes 158 & 160 (examples of exceptions to purchaser-seller requirement).
I See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing holding in Huddleston).
1 See supra text accompanying notes 133-134 (Huddleston Court's treatment of im-
plication analysis).
1 See supra text accompanying notes 112 & 113 (historical significance of S 10(b) remedy).
189 See supra text accompanying notes 125-32 (discussing Court's legislative intent
analysis).
' See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text (discussing legislative concerns sur-
rounding securities transactions).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 23-36 (elements of implied remedy under S 10(b)).
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of fraudulent practices in the securities markets would increase dramatic-
ally. As an antifraud provision, section 10(b) provides fewer procedural
limitations than the express remedies in effectuating the broad remedial
purposes of the securities legislation.19 Yet, the higher standard of proof
and other limitations such as the purchaser-seller requirement necessary
for a section 10(b) cause of action preclude the nullification of the pro-
cedural restrictions surrounding the express remedies of thb '33 and '34
Acts.'93 Thus, an implied remedy under section 10(b) is widely applicable,
ensuring that incidences of fraud will not go unredressed. Notwithstand-
ing the express remedies of the Acts, the congressional goal of deterring
fraud in the market place necessitates the continued existence of the catch-
all implied right of action under section 10(b).
PAUL J. KENNEDY
12 See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text (discussing express remedies under
securities laws).
I" See supra text accompanying notes 111-19 (discussing Huddleston Court's "nullifica-
tion" analysis).
1983] 1067

